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Abstract 
The notion of flexicurity promotes the idea of compensation of labour market deregulation (= 
flexibilization) with advantages in employment and social security. The paper contains a brief 
history of the concept and its operational definition. To monitor effects of flexicurity policies 
in Europe, flexicurity indicators are constructed. The European flexicurity polices are 
analyzed in the neo-liberal perspective, from the trade-unionist viewpoint, and within the 
conception of European welfare state. The empirical investigation shows that, contrary to 
political promises and theoretical considerations, the deregulation of European labour markets 
is absolutely predominating. A contradiction between several European employment policies 
is suggested to surmount by introducing a so called flexinsurance, meaning that the 
employer's contribution to social security should be proportional to the flexibility of the 
contract/risk of becoming unemployed in conjunction with elements of the basic minimum 
income model.  
 
Keywords: flexicurity, labour market flexibility, social security, composite indicators. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Das Konzept Flexicurity umfasst die Kompensation der Arbeitsmarktderegulierung               
(= Flexibilisierung) durch Fortschritte in der Beschäftigungssicherheit und sozialen 
Sicherheit. Um die  Flexicurity-Politiken in Europa nachzuvollziehen, werden Flexicurity-
Indikatoren entwickelt. Die europäischen Flexicurity-Politiken werden in der neo-liberalen 
Perspektive, vom gewerkschaftlichen Standpunkt und im Rahmen der Konzeption des 
europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaates analysiert. Die empirische Studie zeigt, dass entgegen 
politischer Versprechungen und theoretischer Betrachtungen die Deregulierung der 
europäischen Arbeitsmärkte absolut dominiert. Um den politischen Widerspruch zu 
beseitigen, wird eine so genannte Flexinsurance (= Flexicurity-Versicherung) vorgeschlagen. 
Der Beitragsanteil des Arbeitgebers zu den sozialen Kassen soll proportional zu der 
Flexibilität des Arbeitsvertrages und dem entsprechenden Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit gebildet 
werden. 
 
Stichwörter: Flexicurity, Arbeitsmarktflexibilität, soziale Sicherheit, zusammengesetzte 
Indikatoren. 
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Introduction 
The opening of financial markets in the 1970–1980s was thought to improve living standards 
in industrialized countries and to solve the poverty problem in the third world. Investments in 
countries with low labour costs promised cheap goods for consumers and high returns for 
investors. At the same time, the target countries were expected to profit from modern 
technologies and job creation. That was the theoretical starting point for the current 
globalization (World Bank 2002). 
Since then living standards, even in the United States, have visibly improved exclusively for 
top earners (Krugman 2006), to say nothing of developing countries, where the poverty 
problem was not solved and inequality even increased (Stiglitz 2002). On the other hand, a 
legal opportunity of making foreign investments allowed European employers to make 
pressure on their governments to relax the restrictive employment protection threatening 
otherwise to continue moving jobs abroad.  
As a result, a general flexibilization of employment relations is already adopted by the 
European Union as a means to enhance economic performance and to support sustainable 
development. Employers wish to share the burdens of competition with employees, and 
politicians seek to shift the responsibility for employment from the state to individuals. The 
solidarity is getting to be restricted to those who are unable to receive a sufficient income, and 
the adherents of the economically more competitive and socially more “hard” Anglo-Saxon 
model are becoming more influential.  
In most of the post-war Europe, employment relations were regulated by rather constraining 
employment protection legislation and by collective agreements between employers and trade 
unions. The actual contradiction between the flexibilization pursued by employers and strict 
labour market regulation defended by trade unions makes topical the discussion on 
flexibilization and employment protection legislation with regard to economical performance 
and unemployment.  
The advantages and disadvantages of labour market regulation/flexibility versus employment 
were investigated in the influential Jobs Study by the OECD (1994) and then by numerous 
scholars; for a review focusing on European welfare states as defined by Esping-Andersen 
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(1990) see Esping-Andersen (2000a–b). As concluded by Esping-Andersen (2000b, p. 99), 
"the link between labour market regulation and employment is hard to pin down". Under 
certain model assumptions, the same empirical evidence, that unemployment is practically 
independent of the strictness of employment protection legislation, was reported by the 
OECD (1999b, pp. 47–132). There are even cases when the same legislative changes caused 
different effects. For instance, the impact of almost equal deregulation measures on the use of 
fixed-term contracts "was sharply different" in Germany and Spain (OECD, 1999, p. 71).  
At the same time, a good labour market performance under little regulation was inherent in 
the Anglo-Saxon model, that is, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia (OECD 1994, 
Esping-Andrsen 2000a). The deregulation of labour market in the Netherlands, which had a 
different kind of economy, coincided with the "Dutch miracle" of the 1990s (Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997, Gorter 2000, van Oorschot 2000). A similar Danish practice in the 
background of "Eurosclerosis" (Esping-Andersen 2000a, p. 67) was successful as well 
(Björklund 2000, Braun 2001, Madsen 2004). All of these convinced some scholars and 
politicians of the harmlessness and even usefulness of labour market deregulation. It was 
believed that employment flexibility improved competitiveness of firms and thereby 
stimulated production, which in turn stimulated labour markets; for criticism on this 
viewpoint see Coats (2006).  
The claims for flexibilization met a hard resistance, especially in countries with old traditions 
of struggle for labour rights. Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 179) reported with a reference to 
Korver (2001) that the Green Paper: Partnership for a New Organisation of Work of the 
European Commission (1997) "which promoted the idea of social partnership and balancing 
flexibility and security" got a very negative response from French and German trade unions, 
because "the idea of partnership represents a threat to the independence of unions and a denial 
of the importance of worker’s rights and positions, notably at the enterprise level". The ILO 
published a report, concluding that "the flexibilization of the labour market has led to a 
significant erosion of worker’s rights in fundamentally important areas which concern their 
employment and income security and (relative) stability of their working and living 
conditions" (Ozaki 1999, p. 116).  
To handle the growing flexibility of employment relations with lower job security and 
 
 
8
   
 
decreasing eligibility to social benefits, the notion of flexicurity has been introduced. 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) ascribe its conception to a member of the Dutch Scientific 
Council of Government Policy, Professor Hans Adriaansens, and the Dutch Minister of Social 
Affairs, Ad Melkert (Labour Party). In the autumn of 1995 Adriaansens launched this catchy 
word in speeches and interviews, having defined it as a shift from job security towards 
employment security. He suggested compensating the decreasing job security (fewer 
permanent jobs and easier dismissals) by improving employment opportunities and social 
security. 
For instance, a relaxation of the employment protection legislation was supposed to be 
counterbalanced by providing improvements to temporary and part-time workers, supporting 
life-long professional training which facilitates changes of jobs, more favorable regulation of 
working time, and additional social benefits. In December 1995 Ad Melkert presented a 
memorandum Flexibility and Security, on the relaxation of the employment protection 
legislation of permanent workers, provided that temporary workers got regular employment 
status, without however adopting the concept of flexicurity as such. By the end of 1997 the 
Dutch parliament accepted flexibility/security proposals and shaped them into laws which 
came in force in 1999. 
The OECD (2004b, p. 97–98) ascribes the flexicurity to Denmark with its traditionally weak 
employment protection, highly developed social security, and easiness to find a job; see also 
Madsen (2004) and Breedgaard et al. (2005). Regardless of the priority in inventing the word 
flexicurity, both countries were recognized "good-practice examples" (Braun 2001, van 
Oorschot 2001, Kok et al. 2004) and inspired the international flexicurity debate. Although 
some authors still consider flexicurity a specific Dutch/Danish phenomenon (Gorter 2000), 
the idea spread all over Europe in a few years; for a selection of recent international 
contributions see Jepsen and Klammer (2004). At the Lisbon summit of 2000 the EU had 
already referred to this concept (Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 2; Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 
227, Kok et al. 2004), and after the meeting in Villach in January 2006 flexicurity became a 
top theme in the European Commission (European Commission 2006).  
Although flexicurity is getting to be adopted as a European policy, there exists neither its 
"official" definition, nor even an unambiguous idea of it, to say nothing of monitoring 
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instruments (the first questions to be discussed at the governmental the Expert meeting on 
flexicurity strategies and the implications of their adoption at the European level, Lisbon, 
September 25, 2006, were just on definitions, that is, the policy to be adopted at the European 
level is still ill-defined). This study attempts to fill in this gap by operationally defining 
flexicurity, and applying this definition to quantitatively characterize three viewpoints: of 
neo-liberals, of European welfarism, and of trade unions. The flexicurity indices for European 
countries for the recent years are derived from several types of data available form the OECD, 
European Commission, and Eurostat. The factual rather than purely legislative situation is 
reflected by weighting institutional indicators with the variable size of employment and 
unemployment groups with different eligibility to social security benefits.  
The results are not encouraging. Contrary to theoretical opinions and political promises, the 
current deregulation of European labour markets is not adequately compensated by 
improvements in social security. Flexibilization resulted in an increase of unemployment and 
in a disproportional growth of the number of atypically employed (= other than permanent 
full-time, like part-time, fixed-term) or self-employed (Eurostat 2005, Schmid and Gazier 
2002, Seifert and Tangian 2006). After the flexicurity advantages/disadvantages have been 
accounted proportionally to the size of the groups affected, the factual trends turn out to be 
negative even from the viewpoint of neo-liberals, to say nothing of European welfarism and 
of trade unions. The reciprocity between the advantages/disadvantages is illusory, because 
gains are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than losers.  
Thus the study warns against promoting flexicurity policies with no operational control and 
empirical feedback. To surmount negative effects, a so called flexinsurance is proposed, 
meaning that the employer's contribution to social security should be proportional to the 
flexibility of the contract/risk of becoming unemployed. Besides, elements of the basic 
minimal income model are suggested to resolve contradictions between some European 
policies, another obstacle for correctly implementing flexicurity. Finally, constraining 
financial markets might be necessary to keep labour market performance under control. 
Section "An idea of flexicurity" introduces a simple definition of flexicurity with its static and 
dynamic versions. 
Section "Definition: Flexicurity as flexibility–security trade-offs" develops the understanding 
 
 
10
   
 
of flexicurity as a flexibility–security nexus. 
Section "Tracing flexicurity trade-offs with matrices " describes Wilthagen and ILO 
matrices as instruments for tracing flexicurity trade-offs and explains both their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Section "Monitoring flexicurity policies as trajectories in a vector space" suggests an 
alternative way of tracing flexicurity policies which is free from the disadvantages inherent in 
matrix representations. 
Section "Empirical investigation 1: Neo-liberal perspective" presents the results of 
empirically monitoring flexicurity policies of 16 European countries according to the neo-
liberal conception, showing that the deregulation trends are absolutely prevailing. 
Section "Empirical investigation 2: Trade-unionist viewpoint" outlines the inconsistencies of 
neo-liberal and trade-unionist viewpoints at flexicurity together with empirical findings under 
trade-unionist assumptions, showing a quite unsatisfactory development. 
Section "Empirical investigation 3: Reference to the European welfare state" provides an 
empirical evidence from 22 European countries, showing a total decline of the European 
welfare state by the year 2004, contrary to the flexicurity concept. 
Section "Discussion 1 (futuristic): Unconditional deregulation" enumerates different 
consequencies of unconditional flexibilization of employment relations. 
Section "Discussion 2 (political): Contradictions between EU policies and possible solutions" 
brings to light some contradictions between such European policies as "make work pay" and 
flexicurity and suggests a possible way to resolve them. 
Section "Discussion 3 (instrumental): Monitoring tools for flexicurity" proposes to implement 
the prototype models of the paper in a computer system with a user-friendly updatable 
flexicurity internet page like the Eurostat's New Cronos. 
Section "Conclusions" recapitulates the main statements of the paper. 
Section "Annex: Answers to the questions of organizers of the expert meeting" contains 
answers to specific questions discussed at the Expert meeting on flexicurity strategies and the 
implications of their adoptation at the European level, Lisbon, September 25, 2006. 
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An idea of flexicurity  
To give an idea, flexicurity can be metaphorically characterized by analogy with the motto of 
Prague Spring 1968 "socialism with a human face": 
Definition 1 (metaphorical) Flexicurity is a flexibilization (= deregulation) of labour 
markets with "a human face", that is, compensated by some social advantages, in particular, 
for the groups affected. 
The main distinction captured by this simplified definition is that flexicurity differs from 
unconditional deregulation in introducing compensatory measures in social security and 
employment activation. Specific understandings (definitions) of flexicurity may depend on 
flexibilization steps suggested, tempo of deregulation, particular social advantages proposed, 
and estimates of their compensatory equivalence. A consensus in balancing these factors is 
not a pure academic question but rather an issue for bargaining between governments, 
employers, and trade unions, similarly to collective agreements. 
One may also distinguish between static and dynamic flexicurity. A static characterization 
"flexicure country" means a weak labour market regulation combined with a generous social 
security and employment activation measures ("golden triangle"; see OECD 2004b, p. 97), as 
inherent in Denmark.  A dynamic flexicurity relates not to a given state of a given country but 
to its flexibilization process compensated by some social advantages and activation programs, 
as inherent in the Netherlands. One can say that the Netherlands is not such a flexicure 
country as Denmark but pursues a more intensive flexicurity policy.  
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The definition above and the word "flexicurity" itself prompt the (static) flexicurity-
classification of European countries with respect to levels of flexibilization and security 
shown in Table 1. "Flexicure" countries are those which labour market regulation is relaxed 
but social system is generous (Denmark, Finland). "Inflex-secure" countries have strict labour 
regulation and strong social security (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden). "Flex-insecure" 
countries with flexible employment relations and relatively low social protection are 
represented by the United Kingdom. "Inflex-insecure" countries with a poor social security 
and strict labour market regulation are Spain, Portugal, and Czech Republic. A finer 
classification can be obtained if several levels of flexibility and security are considered. 
   
 
Table 1. Static flexicurity classification of some European countries 
Labour market regulation  Social security 
Relaxed   Strict 
Generous Flexicure countries:         
Denmark 
Finland 
Switzerland 
Inflex-secure countries 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Norway 
Poor Flex-insecure countries 
United Kingdom 
Inflex-insecure countries 
Spain 
Portugal 
Czech Republic  
Definition: Flexicurity as flexibility–security trade-offs  
A more comprehensible definition of flexicurity is due to Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 169):  
Definition 2 (conceptual)  [Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and 
in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organization and 
labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security — employment security and social 
security — notably for weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand.  
It is emphasized (p. 170) that flexicurity is not "simply social protection for flexible work 
forces as Klammer and Tillmann (2001), Ferrera et al (2001) and many others tend to analyze 
it". According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 167), flexicurity policies aim at increasing the 
competitiveness of European economies by their further liberalization, attaining a 
compromise between employers, who seek for the deregulation of labour markets, and 
employees, who wish to protect their rights. It explicitly manifests itself in the description of 
flexicurity as a flexibility versus security trade-off (cf. with the word "deliberate" in the above 
definition); see Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p. 44), Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 171), 
Kronauer and Linne (2005), and Ramaux (2006).  
Let us consider notions Flexibility and Security in some detail to better understand which 
trade is proposed. The Flexibility stands for a multivariate aggregate which, according to the 
OECD (1989, p. 13–20), includes: 
• External numerical flexibility (employment flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 101–114;  
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numerical flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 16, external quantitative flexibility by Vielle 
and Walthery 2003, p.8) defined as the employer's ability to adjust the number of 
employees to current needs. In other words, it is the ease of "hiring and firing" which 
manifests itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover). 
• Internal numerical flexibility (work process or functional flexibility by Standing 1999, 
p. 114–116; temporal flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 17, internal quantitative flexibility 
by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8) which is the employer's ability to modify the 
number and distribution of working hours with no change of the number of 
employees. It appears in shiftworking, seasonal changes in the demand for labour, 
weekend/holiday working, overtime and variable hours, see also Keller and Seifert 
(2004, p. 228). 
• Functional flexibility (job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 117–124; internal-
functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 228, internal qualitative flexibility 
by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8), that is, the employers' ability to move their 
employees from one task or department to another, or to change the content of their 
work.  It is reflected by the mobility of workers within enterprises (internal labour 
turnover), see also Regini (2000, p. 16). 
• Wage flexibility (flexible or variable pay by Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171), which 
enables employers to alter wages in response to changing labour market or 
competitive conditions. Typically, employers seek for applying individual 
performance-linked rewarding systems additionally to (or instead of) usual collective 
agreements independent of individual performance, see also Regini (2000, p. 16–17, 
19–21). 
• Externalization flexibility (external functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 
228; one of constituents of job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 123; external 
qualitative flexibility by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8, that is, the employers' ability 
to order some works from external workers or firms without employment contracts but 
with commercial contracts in such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual 
organizations, and entreployees, that is, self-entrepreneurial activities, see Pongratz 
and Voß (2003). 
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The notion of Security also includes several issues. For instance, Standing (1999, p. 52) 
enumerates seven types of security. They are not all relevant to the flexicurity debate, like 
labour market security through state-guaranteed full employment in socialist countries. 
Within the debate Vielle and Walthery (2003, p. 18–19), following Dupeyroux and Ruellan 
(1998),  focus the attention at compensatory functions of securities in case of unemployment, 
illness, advancing age, maternity, invalidity, as well as exceptional medical or family burdens 
(decommodification in the sense of Esping-Andersen (1990)). More specifically, Wilthagen, 
Tros and van Lieshout (2003, p. 4) restrict consideration to the following four types of 
security: 
• Job security (employment security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), `the certainty of 
retaining a specific job with a specific employer' . It is guaranteed by the protection of 
employees against dismissals and against significant changes of working conditions. 
This is the main subject of the employment protection legislation. 
• Employment/employability security (job security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), the 
`certainty of remaining at work (not necessarily with the same employer)'. It means 
the availability of jobs for dismissed and unemployed, corresponding to their 
qualification and previous working conditions. The employability of job seekers can 
be improved by life-long professional training which can be offered both by 
employers and by training programs within active labour market policies; see Keller 
and Seifert (2004, p. 235). Tros (2004, p. 5) also mentions entreployees, organization 
of firm-firm job pools, and facilities for work-work transitions. 
• Income (social) security, the `income protection in the event that paid work ceases'. 
Standing considers it more generally as protection of income through minimum wage 
machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, including progressive 
taxation, provisions for old age (post-employment security by Keller and Seifert 2004, 
p. 236–238), etc. 
• Combination security (not considered by other authors cited), "the certainty of being 
able to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations. This last 
form of security cannot be traced back to the other forms of security". Tros (2004, p. 
5) explains it further as a work-life balance, work-family balance, early flexible part-
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time retirement, flexible working hours, and leave facilities. 
Thus, a flexicurity policy is imagined as an increase in the five types of flexibility 
compensated by improvements in four types of security. 
Tracing flexicurity trade-offs with matrices 
Matrices like in Table 2 are often suggested "as a heuristic tool to trace flexicurity policies as 
specific trade-offs" (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171). The cells of the table show policy 
measures relevant to the intersecting types of flexibility and security. Some measures are 
multi-relevant, like entreployees, appearing at several row/column intersections. Such tables 
well illustrate the compound structure of Flexibility and Security but at a closer look fail to  
describe flexicurity trade-offs. 
Firstly, there is no space for locating deregulation-only measures or purely security 
innovations. In particular, the Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security summarized in Table 3 
(by the same authors) cannot be inscribed into Table 2. The Dutch Law consists of a number 
of items, each contributing either to flexibility, or to security. The cells of Table 2, on the 
contrary, combine certain types of flexibility and security simultaneously. 
Secondly, Table 2 classifies policy measures into flexibility/security types instead of 
describing the flexibility/security compensation (trade-off). Such a simultaneous 
classification makes policy measures ambiguous (in favour of flexibility or security?) which, 
concealing the compensation issues, creates an illusion of a "deliberate" solution. Moreover, 
debits can be presented as credits following the proverb "Every cloud has a silver lining". 
For instance, consider ‘Firm-firm job pools’ at the intersection of row External numerical 
flexibility and column Employment security. If it is a flexibility measure to "softly" dismiss 
workers (it stands in the row External numerical flexibility) then there should be an 
equivalent social compensation which is missed. If it is a security measure against easy 
dismissals (it stands in the column Employment security) then it is too weak because it 
provides poorer  
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Table 2. The matrix aimed at tracing flexibility versus security trade-offs with a flexicurity policy for 
older workers as given by Tros (2004) 
 Job security 
 
Employment security
 
Income 
security 
Combination 
security 
 
External 
numerical 
flexibility 
 
 Firm-firm job pools 
Facilities work-work 
transitions 
Older enterployees 
Retirement 
arrangements 
 
 
Internal 
numerical 
flexibility 
 
Part-time work 
Flexible retirement 
Part-time enterployees 
 
 Flexible 
retirement 
 
Part-time retirement 
Flexible age (pre-
pension 
Flexible working 
hours 
Leave facilities 
Functional 
flexibility 
 
Education/training 
Adaptation in working 
hours/ tasks 
 
Education/training 
Seniority/bridge works 
Job rotation 
Age-aware career and 
job structures 
  
 
Table 3. The Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security (extraction) from January 1, 1999, as given by 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004), which cannot be inscribed into Table 1 
Flexibility Security 
• Adjustment of the regulation of 
fixed-term employment contracts: 
after 3 consecutive contracts or 
when the total length of 
consecutive contracts totals 3 
years or more, a permanent 
contract exists (previously this 
applied to fixed-term contracts 
that had been extended once). 
• The obligation of temporary work 
agencies (TWA) to be in 
possession of a permit has been 
withdrawn. The maximum term 
for this type of employment 
(formerly 6 months) is abolished 
as well. 
• The notice period is in principle 1 
month and 4 months at maximum 
(used to be 6 months). 
 
• Introduction of so-called presumptions of law which 
strengthen the position of atypical workers (regarding the 
existence of an employment contract and the number of 
working hours agreed in that contract); the existence of an 
employment contract is more easily presumed. 
• A minimum entitlement to three hours’ pay for on-call 
workers each time they are called in to work. 
• Regulation of the risk of non-payment of wages in the event 
of there being no work for an on-call worker: the period over 
which employers may claim that they need not pay wages for 
hours not worked has been reduced to six months. 
• A worker’s contract with a TWA is considered a regular 
employment contract; only in the first 26 weeks are the 
agency and the agency worker allowed a certain degree of 
freedom with respect to starting and ending the employment 
relationship. 
• Special dismissal protection has been introduced for 
employees engaged in trade union activities. 
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career opportunities than retaining the same job. If it is thought to combine flexibility and 
security then the degree of compensation should be indicated. 
Another way of classifying (static) flexibility/security combinations has been used by Sperber 
(2006) with a reference to ILO (Auer 2005, Auer and Cazas 2002) and OECD (2004). Table 4 
classifies countries with respect to two indicators: strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and of social protection (UIB —unemployment insurance benefits). Here, 
each matrix dimension represents two grades of one indicator rather than several types of 
flexibility or security. Besides, countries are specified with unemployment rate regarded as an 
evaluation measure of institutional arrangements (Blanchard 2004, OECD 2004). Other 
evaluation measures can be GDP growth (Pissarides 2000–2001, Blanchard 2006), job 
security (Auer and Cazas 2002), or some political criterion. 
Table 4. Institutional arrangements and unemployment rate (Sperber 2006, referring to ILO) 
Flexibility: Strictness of EPL                         
(employment protection legislation) 
Social security: UIB 
 (unemployment 
insurance benefits) Low High 
High Denmark            
Employment protection 8 
Social protection 27 
Unemployment rate 4.4% 
France                
Employment protection 21 
Social protection 20 
Unemployment rate 9.3% 
Low USA                   
Employment protection 1 
Social protection 3 
Unemployment rate 4.0% 
Japan                  
Employment protection 14 
Social protection 4 
Unemployment rate 4.7% 
 
Note that Table 4 is an advanced version of Table 1, displaying additionally quantitative 
measurements and the third dimension — the overall evaluation of countries in terms of 
labour market performance. On the other hand Table 4 is not appropriate for displaying 
several flexibility or security types as Table 2. Besides, Table 4 can be misleading, prompting 
that the less regulation the better (unemployment is lower), which is not applicable to all 
countries. 
Thus, Wilthagen's matrix emphasizes the many-sidedness of flexibility and security but does 
not reflect flexibility/security compensation rates to trace trade-offs. The ILO matrix is aimed 
at flexibility/security evaluation but fails to operate on more than one flexibility and one 
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security dimension, and the flexibility/security evaluation can be tendentious. 
Monitoring flexicurity policies as trajectories in a vector space 
A practical instrument for tracing flexicurity policies should combine advantages of both 
representation tools given by Tables 2 and 4 and at the same time enhance the dynamic aspect 
of flexicurity. To obtain such a monitoring instrument make two dimensions of Table 4 to 
be continuous axes. The resulting two-dimensional plane is shown in Figure 1. The frontal 
horizontal axis Strictness of EPL displays the strictness of employment protection legislation 
measured in some conditional %. The strictness grows from left to right, implying flexibility 
at the left hand and rigidity at the right hand: 
Flexibility = 100% – Strictness of EPL . 
The second axis Security shows the aggregated social security also measured in some 
conditional %. States of the society are depicted by points (vectors) in the two-dimensional 
plane Strictness of EPL–Security. Each country, being specified with two indicators, can be 
depicted as a vector in this plane. 
If five types of flexibility and four types of security should be considered as in the Wilthagen 
matrix, then the horizontal axes in Figure 1 split into five flexibility and four security axes, 
respectively. The horizontal axes in Figure 1 can be regarded as aggregates of several 
dimensions. 
In the given paper we consider but two main factors of flexicurity, Strictness of EPL and 
Social (income) security. Recall that the flexicurity debate originates from claims to relax the 
EPL which constrains the external numerical flexibility. Consequently, the Strictness of EPL 
can be regarded as an indicator of the External numerical flexibility which plays the key role 
in the debate. The strictness of EPL and generosity of social security benefits are often 
regarded as main regulators of labour markets (Blanchard and Tirole 2004). 
To speak of a trade-off, one has to assume a social preference. A preference is usually 
represented by a utility function which takes greater values at more preferable points and 
remains constant at equivalent points joined into indifference curves (= trade-offs). The 
 
 
19
   
 
indifference curves are but points of the same height at the utility hill; see Figure 1. The 
utility function implements the evaluation measure, and remaining at indifference curves 
means that a decrease in employment protection is "deliberately" compensated by an increase 
in social security. 
For, instance, suppose that a country in 1995 and in 2000 is characterized by vectors 1995 = 
(EPL1995, S1995) and 2000 = (EPL2000, S2000), respectively. If the flexicurity policy is 
implemented correctly then the vector 2000 lies in the indifference curve through 1995 as in 
Figure 1. If vector 2000 lied in the red Pareto-worsening domain (more flexibility under no 
improvement in security) then it would mean that a deregulation-only policy takes place. 
Such a representation allows us to introduce an operational definition of flexicurity. 
Definition 3 (instrumental) A "flexicure" country" is the one which vector is located close to 
the high flexibility–high security edge of the flexibility–security rectangle. Pursuing a 
flexicurity policy corresponds to a motion of the country's vector in the plane "Strictness of 
EPL–Social security" along an indifference curve of social utility towards lower strictness of 
EPL and higher social security (‘North-West’). 
This definition covers both static and dynamic aspects of flexicurity. Indifference curves 
incorporate the flexibility-security compensation rates. Since a vector space can have an 
arbitrary number of dimensions, several types of flexibility and security can be considered. 
The social utility function can reflect different viewpoints with particular compensation rates 
(= trade-offs, as understood either by the EU, or by national governments, or by trade-
unions), emphasize certain aspects of social protection, or it can be a macroeconomic 
indicator depending on both factors, like unemployment rate or GDP growth (Pissarides 
2000–2001, OECD 2004, Blanchard 2004–2006). However, the agreement that flexibility 
must be compensated by security implicitly means that the more employment and social 
protection, the better (otherwise what is the compensation for?). In turn it implies that the 
Pareto-worsening and Pareto-bettering domains (directions of simultaneous deterioration and 
simultaneous improvement, respectively) are common to all countries, being independent of 
the shape of utility hill. This property is very important for our future analysis, since we do 
not know utility functions of European countries, which can be all different. 
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 Figure 1. A flexicurity policy along a tradeoff ‘Flexibility versus security’  
 
nvestigation 1: Neo-liberal perspective 
 neo-liberal viewpoint, we need first of all two empirical indicators of 
curity as they are understood by neo-liberals. For the labour market 
e OECD (1999b, 2004b) indicator "Strictness of employment protection 
) for evaluating permanent/temporary employment and the easiness of 
sals.  
ator is aimed at reflecting institutional EPL-levels. To trace actual policies 
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we have to reflect factual rather than intentional state of affairs. The employment protection is 
often conditioned by the employment status, for instance, permanently employed are 
generally better protected than temporary employed. Therefore, to estimate the national 
average, we take the weighted EPL-indicator with weights being proportional to the size of 
corresponding employment groups (yearly data on their size are available from Eurostat 
2004). Thus the national indicator varies due to institutional changes (laws) and due to 
mobility between employment groups; see Tangian (2004a–b, 2005a) for details2. 
Define the second indicator, "Social security", basing on the OECD (2002b) summary of 
social security benefits; for the updated regulation see European Commission (2004). The 
OECD understands social security as a compound of five social security benefits: 
• unemployment insurance,  
• public pensions,  
• paid sick leave,  
• paid maternity leave, and  
• paid holidays3.  
The eligibility to the benefits depends on the country's laws and on the employment status (= 
adherence to employment groups), differing for different employment groups. For example, 
normally employed are better secured than atypically employed. If the first group is large and 
the second is small then the social security of the society is quite high. However, if the first 
                                                 
 
2 To give an idea of the interaction of institutional and mobility factors consider an example. Suppose that there 
are two groups of unemployed, of highly aided who get 700 EUR a month, and of low aided who get 300 EUR a 
month, and that the groups constitute 90% and 10% of unemployed, respectively. Thus the national average is 
700*0.9 + 300*0.1 = 660 EUR/month. Let there be an institutional improvement, that is, all get 10% more aid, 
but at the same time, due to mobility between the groups, the first group is reduced to 50% and the second 
increases up to 50%. Then the national average is 770*0.5 + 330*0.5 = 550 EUR/month, that is, contrary to the 
general institutional improvement by 10% the national average decreases due to mobility from 660 to 550 
EUR/month, that is, by 16.6%. 
3 Entitlement to paid holidays is usually not considered within the flexicurity debate. It is not quite logical. 
Securities are aimed at compensating income losses and exceptional medical and family burdens, including 
vacations. Therefore, no entitlement to paid holidays discriminates those flexibly employed who work few 
hours, under short-time contracts, or self-employed, which should be taken into account. 
 
 
22
   
 
group is small and the second is large then, under the same jurisdiction, the social security 
level should be considered low. Therefore, the factual rather than institutional social security 
in a country is the weighted average indicator of social groups with the weights being 
proportional to their size (see also footnote 2). 
Within the flexicurity debate, Klammer and Tillmann (2001, p. 514) and Hoffmann and 
Walwei (2000) provide a classification of employment types with respect to four dichotomic 
indicators:  
• permanent/fixed-term,  
• full-time/part-time,  
• employed/self-employed, and  
• in agriculture/not in agriculture.  
For self-employed the discrimination between "permanent" and "fixed-term" is not relevant, 
and from 24=16 employment groups it remains eight. Thus we obtain 8 employment groups in 
each of 16 countries, totally 128 groups4. 
The idea of the composite indicator of social security is illustrated in Figure 2 for Germany. 
For each year, the relative size of an employment group is shown by the width of its color 
rectangle. The indices of five social security benefits are shown by thickness of five color 
layers, so that the social security level of the employment group is the height of the color 
rectangle. The black residual indicates the "deficit of security", lacking to attain the 100%-
security. The national composite indicator of social security is weighted proportionally to the 
size of employment groups. In Figure 2 it is exactly the ratio of color area to the total 
rectangle of the year. For more details see Tangian (2004 and 2005a). 
                                                 
 
4 The authors cited consider no labour market outsiders as suggested by Wilthagen and Tros (2004). 
Respectively, we do not consider them here, also because flexicurity deals with the flexibility of employment 
relations. 
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Figure 2. Construction of Security indicator from five benefits for eight employment groups 
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Thus the indicator of social security so constructed is sensitive both to institutional changes 
(laws) and mobility between employment groups with different eligibility to social security 
benefits.  
Figure 3. Flexibility-Security country trajectories for all employment groups (neo-liberal 
perspective) starting in different years (due to data availability) and all ending in 2003. The diagonals 
in the background conditionally show neo-liberal indifference lines 
 
As for country's social utility functions, it is not necessary to define them at the moment. Our 
main finding is that the country trajectories go into the Pareto-worsening domain 
(deregulation with no social security compensation), which location is independent of the 
shape of social utility function. 
Figure 3 is a map of our policy space. It corresponds to the horizontal plane of Figure 1, 
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Strictness of EPL–Security. The compass in the bottom-left edge of Figure 3 shows the 
cardinal points. The indicators of strictness of EPL and of social security play the role of 
navigation instruments, with which the location of European countries in the policy space is 
determined. It allows us to trace their dynamical trajectories (up to the year 2003, starting 
however at different years, depending on data availability). 
The flexicure countries with a high flexibility and a high security are located in the top-left 
corner (Denmark and Finland). The inflexicure countries with a low flexibility (= high 
Strictness of EPL) and a high index of Security are located in the top-right corner of the chart 
(Sweden and the Netherlands). The only outlier in the left-bottom corner with high flexibility 
and low social security indicator is the flex-insecure United Kingdom. The bottom-right 
corner is occupied by inflex-insecure countries with a strict employment protection legislation 
and relatively little advanced social security (Spain, Portugal, and Czech Republic).  
The simplest social utility function u = (Strictness of EPL + Security)/2 is shown by 
indifference lines. The social preference increases in the ‘North-East’ direction, decreases in 
the ‘South-West’ direction, and remains constant  along the diagonal indifference lines. The 
pursuing a flexicurity policy means the direction of a country’s trajectory towards the ‘North-
West’. It is inherent in Denmark in the 1990s and the Netherlands in the late 1990s, when the 
flexicurity debate was initiated. Since the exact slope of indifference curves is not known, it is 
unclear whether the flexibility-security compensation was ‘deliberate’, but at least a 
flexicurity development cannot be denied.  
All directions between ‘West’ and ‘South’ correspond to Pareto-worsening for all imaginable 
social utility functions (no improvement in both factors—no compensation comes in 
question). Since, with the only short-time exceptions for Denmark and Netherlands, all 
trajectories are directed towards ‘South’, ‘South-West’, or ‘West’, the deregulation-only 
policies are unambiguously prevailing, whereas the much promoted flexicurity is 
practically invisible.  
Empirical investigation 2: Trade-unionist viewpoint 
According to the viewpoint so long discussed, the relaxation of the EPL required by 
employers can be equivalently compensated by better social security benefits to workers. 
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However, from the viewpoint of trade unions, first of all French and German, flexibilization 
of employment relations can be hardly compensated by social security benefits, and giving up 
labour rights for social advantages is not appropriate. Even if each particular compromise 
seems more or less fair, their succession can lead away from the social status quo and the 
employees can finally get nothing or very little for their pains. It can run as in the known tale 
about a man who exchanges a horse for a cow, then the cow for a sheep, and so on until he 
finds himself with nothing but a needle which he loses on the way home.  
Trade unions doubt that better social guarantees can adequately compensate a higher risk to 
lose a job.  Apply a simple logical argument. Assume that, indeed, an increment in the risk to 
lose a job can be compensated by an increment in social benefits. After a number of 
increments ("equivalent" exchanges), the risk grows into certainty, that is, loss of a job, with 
the living standard remaining intact. It implies a little motivation to work, resulting in a low 
employment incapable to cover high social expenditures. This contradiction disproves the 
equivalence of higher unemployment risks and higher social guarantees, so that the emerging 
disadvantages can be compensated only partially but never completely. 
Besides, entrusting the workers’ welfare to the welfare-giver, the state, is unreliable. Every 
political change may result in social cuts (as now in Germany). Employment protection, on 
the contrary, guarantees jobs and, consequently, a stable income even during recessions and 
political crises (Bewley 1999).  
The next point is that non-benevolently changing jobs destroys career prospects. Each new 
employment means that one must begin from the start and establish oneself anew; it can be 
necessary to move to another place which complicates the family life.  
The conception of flexicurity as proposed by neoliberals may look fair: one commodity 
(labour rights) is exchanged for another commodity (social security), and the exchange rate 
should be negotiated. The default is however that on the neoliberals’ playing field, to which 
they invite, everything can be bought and sold (which is not always true!). This apparent 
natural prerequisite leaves trade unions with no chance to win. In a sense, it is suggested that 
workers’ social health (= the right to remain at work) be exchanged for a treatment (= social 
care in the form of advanced social security benefits). In other words, give your working hand 
and get prosthesis instead. However: Can prosthesis, whatever its value, substitute a healthy 
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hand?  
From the viewpoint of neo-liberals, flexicurity is a policy to reconcile employees with the 
actual labour market deregulation. The deregulation is thought to improve the 
competitiveness of European economy and to enhance the sustainable development. All of 
these are required to become economically more powerful.  
From the trade-unionist viewpoint, the sustainable development is necessary as long as it 
improves living and working conditions of employees. If under "sustainable development" the 
worker's well-being is not enhanced and a better labour market performance (if any) is 
attained at the price of stress and lack of confidence in the future then the "sustainable 
development" can be put in question. Indeed: Do higher industrial productivity and 
competitiveness constitute the prime human goals? Why sustainable development is put 
beyond social values? In other words, is it more important to be economically rich rather than 
socially healthy?  
There are also doubts in the social fairness of flexicurity. Every step towards a higher labour 
flexibility meets interests of employers. Business gets rid of restrictions, managers improve 
performance by rotating and squeezing personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses 
are recovered by the state — costly reforms and additional social security benefits. Therefore, 
such a flexibilization scenario turns out to be a long-running indirect governmental donation 
to firms. Since the state budget originates from taxpayers, the employees are the ones 
contributing to the donation. 
Finally, it is often emphasized that the flexicurity as a trade-off is advantageous for social 
beneficiaries. For employees it turns out that the already incomplete social security 
compensation for their labour rights is further reduced in favor of ‘weaker groups’ (otherwise, 
where to take resources from? In fact, all money paid to anybody is subtracted from 
somebody). Moreover, the compensation for employees in the form of social security looks as 
a charity rather than as a reward for their contribution to the national economy. This ethical 
nuance damages the civil image of employees, equalizing them to non-employed.  
Therefore, trade unions are inclined to consider flexicurity as a measure to protect weak work 
forces but not at the price of charging other employees with disadvantages. The specificity of 
the trade-unionist viewpoint at flexicurity is reflected by the alternative definition below. It is 
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just the one criticized by Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 170):  
Definition 4 (trade-unionist). [Flexicurity is] social protection for flexible work forces, 
understood as "an alternative to pure flexibilization" (Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 226), and 
"to a deregulation-only policy" (Klammer 2004, p. 283); see also WSI (2000).  
Thus, the preference of trade unions is determined primarily by the strictness of EPL, and the 
second factor, security, is considered ceteris paribus, if only the first factor remains 
invariable; see Figure 4. The preference can be imagined as a staircase with floors being the 
EPL strictness levels and each flight of stairs being the full-range ascent along the social 
security scale. This type of preference is called lexicographic by analogy with a lexicon 
which words are ordered alphabetically letter-by-letter (here, by the strictness of EPL and 
then  by the security level). The lexicographic preference has no indifference curves which 
degenerate into single points (Tangian 1991, p. 49–50). It means that a shortage of a high-
priority factor cannot be compensated by any surplus of lower-priority factors.  
According to the trade-unionist concept of flexicurity, the focus should be made at improving 
the employment and social security of flexible workers. Figure 5 shows what happens at the 
market of flexible labour forces, separately of the market of regular employment.  
The vertical indifference isolines relate to the first-priority component (EPL) in the trade-
unionist lexicographic preference, showing that up-downward changes of security are not 
important. Any deviation of policy trajectory to the left is unfavorable for trade unions, and an 
upward increment is appreciated if only the horizontal increment is negligible. 
In many cases this increase is not due to a better employment and social protection of flexibly 
employed. It often results from the increasing share of part-time and temporarily employed 
(the second and third groups in Figure 2) in the group of flexibly employed (groups 2–8 in 
Figure 2), where they have superior indices. More and more young people and women, 
entering labour market, sign part-time contracts, thereby reducing the share of normal 
employment (Austria, France, Belgium, Poland).  
Another factor is the decreasing share of little secured self-employed since they close their 
business and become employees (France, Austria, Belgium). Thereby the share of better 
secured within flexibly employed increases and the average security indicator grows. 
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The greatest decline in social utility due to a decrease in the Strictness of EPL (we speak 
exclusively of flexibly employed!) is inherent in Sweden (from 42.8 to 31.6%), Denmark 
(from 31.0 to 21.9%), Germany (from 43.1 to 36.9%), Czech Republic (from 15.6 to 11.7%), 
the Netherlands (from 42.9 to 40.5%), and Portugal (from 25.4 to 24.9%). 
 
Figure 4. Lexicographic preference of trade unions with no trade-offs to follow 
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 Figure 5. Flexibility-Security country trajectories for flexibly employed only (trade-
ist perspective) starting in different years (due to data availability) and all ending in 
he verticals in the background show trade unions’ indifference lines of first priority countries the decline is caused by transitions between groups of flexibly employed. 
en the share of best-protected permanently part-time employed decreased from 18.3 
, and in Denmark from 19.5 to 17.3%. In Czech Republic the share of well-protected 
nt part-timers decreased not much (from 3.1 to 2.3%) but the share of self-employed, 
 not protected by labour laws, increased (from 10.7 to 15.3%). 
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Some positive changes in the security indicator for flexibly employed should not be 
misinterpreted. Its growth is mainly due to the reduction of normal employment. It is not 
necessary to emphasize that such a trend does not make trade unions very happy. 
The key problem is that social preferences of neo-liberals and trade unions more than just 
differ, they differ in the type of preference. The former have a hill-shaped utility with gradual 
ascents/descents in every direction. Trade-unions have a stair-like utility with gradual 
ascents/descents only along the ‘flight of stairs’ but with leaps in all other directions.  The 
subject for bargaining— determining the slope of social trade-off—is questionable for trade 
unions whose preference has no indifference curves which might have a slope. 
As mentioned by Wilthagen and Tros, (2004, p. 169): "some recent studies are pessimistic 
that appropriate trade-offs can be found between flexibility and security". The problem is in 
the very existence of trade-offs: "If these levels … do not exist, negotiations and trade-offs 
are hard to envisage, because there is ‘no more/or less’ situation’" (Op. cit, p.181). 
Empirical investigation 3: Reference to the European welfare 
state 
The definition of flexicurity as a trade-off assumes a compensation of flexibilization by 
advantages in social security. From the viewpoint of European welfare state, the key stone of 
social security is income security aimed at compensating the loss of earnings and providing 
means of existence for those who do not work. Therefore, we have to evaluate the progress in 
income security and to judge, whether it compensates the actual deregulation of labour 
markets, as measured with the EPL-indicator of the OECD used in previous sections. 
An evaluation of income security could be based on interviewing unemployed on their in- and 
out-of-work net income. However, even if such an interview could be performed, it is 
unlikely that unemployed provided accurate figures because of complicated tax and benefit 
interactions. Besides, a number of persons may refuse to answer questions on their income. 
A possible solution is obtained with a (micro-) census simulating model which combines both 
empirical and institutional (= rule-based) and empirical (= statistical) features. It uses the 
OECD Tax-Benefit models (1998, 1999a, 2002a, 2004a, 2005) to normatively derive 
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individual answers of unemployed from their personal situations (age, family type, number of 
children, previous earnings, duration of unemployment). The goal is obtaining the net-income 
replacement rates (NRR) for unemployed persons, which is the previous-to-current net 
income ratio. The statistics of personal cases is available from Eurostat (2005). It is used to 
derive the national average NRR which shows the average degree with which social benefits 
compensate the loss of previous earnings; for details see (Tangian 2005b). 
The analysis of national NRR-indicators for 22 European countries reveals that they attain 
some maximum during the period 1995–2003 and decrease by 2004, meaning “the good times 
are over”. This viewpoint is illustrated in Figure 6, showing the change of the national NRR 
by 2004 with respect to its maximum in some previous year. The bottom countries have the 
largest social security decline. The higher the country in the graph, the less the security 
decline.  
The only exception is Poland which exhibits a minor progress. However, the growth of Polish 
indicator by 0.8% occurs in the background of devaluation of the APW by 24% (Average 
production wage — used by the OECD and Eurostat as a reference of the national wage 
level). Without such devaluation, the Polish social system would decline by about 23%, so 
that the real position of Poland in Figure 6 should be at the bottom next to Slovak Republic.  
What are the causes of the decline of European social security?  
In many countries the actual decline of social security occurs under institutional 
improvements: “Contrary to the decline in benefit amounts seen in earlier period, payment 
rates were made more generous in several countries” (OECD 2004a, p. 116). Some countries 
considerably increased their benefits and some relaxed eligibility conditions. Indeed, as 
reported by Adema and Ladaique (2005, p. 12) the social expenditure in the OECD countries 
grows with the GDP and in certain years even more rapidly.  
For instance, the dynamic of German institutional development is shown in Figure 7. Its six 
plots correspond to six levels of previous earnings: 40, 50, 67, 100, 150, and 200% APW.  
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Each plot is built from seven yearly curves. All the plots are computed with the OECD Tax-
Benefit Models with no statistical data. The abrupt increase in the plot relief in 2001 indicates 
that social security benefits became more generous for all the six earning levels. At the same 
time Germany exhibits a decline of social security by 4.1% in Figure 6. A similar situation is 
inherent in many other countries; see similar plots for other European countries in (Tangian 
2005b). 
Figure 6. Decline of European social security by 2004 after the highest peak in 1995–2003 shown by 
reduction of national Net Replacement Rates (NRR). Source: Author’s Census-Simulating Model with the 
EuroStat Labour Force Survey data and OECD Tax-Benefit Models 
 
 
 
Since no institutional decline is generally observed, the only its cause is a change in personal 
situations. Recall that the personal situations are specified with family type (single, married 
couple with one earner, married couple with two earners, number of children), age, and 
employment parameters like previous earnings and duration of unemployment. According to 
Eurostat (2005), the dynamics of family types is not much changing in the recent years. The 
earnings do, but together with the GDP and social expenditure (Eurostat 2005). 
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Figure 7. Normative Net Replacement Rate (NRR) during 1–60 months of unemployment for one of 75 
family situations (one-earner couple with 2 children, 40 year-old earner, 22 years working record) in 
Germany. Source: Author’s derivation from OECD Tax-Benefit models 
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The only explanations of the decline of European social security are longer periods of 
unemployment and shorter periods of employment which disqualify employees from high 
social benefits. These phenomena follow from the flexibilization of employment relations. 
Therefore, the flexibilization results not only in employment insecurity but also in social 
insecurity, reducing the NRR due to shorter employment periods. 
In this relation, what can be said about flexicurity? As shown with the OECD indicator of 
strictness of EPL, the labour market deregulation is distinctly progressing. From the 
viewpoint of European welfarism, social security experiences a decline. Therefore, it cannot 
compensate the flexibilization as required by flexicurity. 
Discussion 1 (futuristic): Unconditional deregulation 
The Club of Rome foresees three scenarios of the world future with regard to overpopulation, 
shortage of resources, and ecological problems (Radermacher 2006a-b): 
1. A big war with a drastic reduction of the world population (15% likelihood) 
2. The rich benevolently sacrifice their excessive well-being to help the poor (35% 
likelihood) 
3. The "brasilianization" of the world, meaning that the world population splits into a 
relatively small group of rich (people, countries) and a large group of poor (50% 
likelihood) 
The contemporary development indicates rather at the third scenario (United Nations 
Development Programme 2002). As mentioned in Introduction, living standards, even in the 
United States, visibly improve exclusively for top earners (Krugman 2006), the poverty 
problem is not solved and inequality even increases (Stiglitz 2002). From this standpoint, the 
"sustainable development" is required to "meet the challenge of India and China" (Coats 
2006, p. 5, 23, OECD 2005, p. 25, UK Presidency of the EU 2005), in other words, to protect 
the superiority of the rich over the poor. The sustainable development is not an objective 
aimed at supporting the European social model with flexibilization being an instrument, as 
declared by UK Presidency of the EU (2005), but rather an instrument itself for the goal 
which is not explicitly formulated. Indeed, if the European well-being was higher before the 
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"sustainable development", what is the latter for?  
If economy is not an objective but an instrument of politics, and if the sustainable 
development with obligatory flexibilization is really intended to enhance the European social 
model then flexicurity should be implemented with clear social priorities. However, as 
follows from our empirical study, the situation is far from being satisfactory. It looks that at 
the moment flexicurity does not hold up to theoretical expectations and political promises. 
Instead of deliberate compensation of flexibilization by advantages in social security, the 
deregulation-only policy is absolutely prevailing. Let us outline briefly what may happen if 
the labour market deregulation in Europe will remain unconstrained and not sufficiently 
compensated by advantages in social security.  
Career prospects. As already mentioned, flexible employment destroys career prospects. 
Indeed, each new job means a new start, often implying a starting salary, especially if an 
employee is little experienced in fulfilling new tasks. Thereby, a higher risk of interrupted 
employment under flexibilization, or changes of employer increases the risk of remaining at 
the bottom of professional hierarchy. 
Individualism and climate at work. The enhanced mobility with frequent changes of 
working teams means the non-belonging to any collective. It results in an individualistic 
psychology with no solidarity. If earnings and competitiveness are becoming the only sense 
of life, the social climate at work can hardly be good and relations between colleagues are 
unlikely to be more than formal. 
Loss of self-identification and destruction of civil society. Frequent professional 
reorientations inherent in flexible work lead to the loss of professional identity and of the 
feeling of social significance. People with no social self-identification can hardly bare social 
responsibility and are unlikely to constitute a civil society.  
Family life. Income insecurity, mobility of the workplace, and individualistic psychology 
obviously complicate family life. If both partners are flexibly employed then the difficulties 
are multiplied. The frequent necessity of changing schools is not the best option for children 
either. Marriages which require settling down are little compatible with professional 
activities, and the marriage age grows correspondingly.  
Demography. Lowering birth quotas caused by fewer marriages due to flexibilization can 
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create demographic problems. The percentage of aging population will grow, and the fraction 
of employable population will decrease. The decreasing contributions to social security will 
sharpen the deficit of retirement funds. On the other hand, the demand for labour force will 
grow. In turn, it can stimulate additional immigration with a number of social side effects. 
Increasing inequality. Destroying career prospects of employees leads to the situation when 
an increasing fraction of population will be unable to get out of in-work poverty or to reach 
the middle-class standards. For instance, the actual German debate on poverty highlights 6.5 
Mio-large underclass (Gammelin 2006, König 2006, Schmidt 2006). The society will likely 
fall into top and low classes with the middle class gradually disappearing. In a sense, the 
society will return to the clan organization with little transitions between them and drastic and 
sustained inequality. 
Thus, we come back to the third scenario of the Club of Rome. If flexibilization will not be 
constrained and flexicurity will not be implemented appropriately, the European social model 
will not survive. 
Discussion 2 (political): Contradictions between EU policies 
and possible solutions 
Keeping the "apocalyptic visions" of the previous section aside, let us consider more specific 
and topical problems. Namely, there are several European policies which are inconsistent 
with each other: 
European welfare policy which suggests certain living standards independently of 
employment. It assumes a stable labour market performance and is backed up by a strong 
social security system (Esping-Andersen 1990, Auer and Gazier 2002, Ramaux 2006).  
Flexibilization of employment relations (3rd guideline for European Employment Strategy; 
see European Commission 2005) is aimed at improving the competitiveness of European 
economy and sustainable development. In particular, it means a relaxation of employment 
protection legislation. This relaxation contradicts to the employment security assumed in the 
conception of welfare state. 
Flexicurity (European Commission 2006) The above mentioned contradiction is hoped to be 
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resolved by compensating the relaxation of labour protection by advances in social and 
employment security, imagined as a flexicurity trade-off.  
Make work pay (8th guideline for European Employment strategy, European Commission 
2005) is aimed at stimulating the unemployed to active labour market participation. Similarly 
to flexicurity, the “make work pay” policy is also a trade-off, but between the social 
protection and maximizing the gain from moving to work (OECD 2004, p. 92). The policy 
“make work pay” contradicts flexicurity, because it includes reductions of security benefits 
which, according to flexicurity, should be improved.  
European policy of respecting civil society initiatives should be mentioned. It assumes a 
significant influence of non-governmental organizations on policy-making. In particularly, the 
opinion of trade unions always played an important role in labour market regulation. In recent 
(neoliberal) discussions the role of trade unions and collective agreements is often put in 
question. 
Besides, as follows from the very idea of trade-offs (compensation, that is, no possibility of 
simultaneous improvements), the policies enumerated contradict each other. Since they 
interact through the social security system, their consistency means the consistency with the 
social security. Or, the social security should be made consistent with the three policies.  
The social security system has been developed for many decades. It is overcomplicated 
especially in interaction with the tax system, and it is quite difficult to change one of its 
elements without affecting others. The unprecedented decline of European social security in 
the background of institutional improvements shows that only a radical reform can make it 
actually efficient and resolve policy contradictions. It should be also realized that the level of 
social security reform should match the level of global changes in labour market regulation. 
Otherwise, there is a risk of following Saltykov-Shchzedrin's (1826–1889) satire "How to 
make an unprofitable enterprise profitable, not changing anything in it?" 
A possible solution could be flexinsurance together with elements of the basic minimum 
income model. 
The flexinsurance assumes that the employer’s contribution to social security should be 
proportional to the flexibility of the contract (Tangian 2004b). It has the following 
advantages: 
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• A higher risk of atypical employees to become unemployed is compensated, and 
contributions to social security are made adequate. 
• Progressive contributions motivate employers to hire employees more favorably, but 
without rigidly restricting the labour market flexibility. 
• Flexinsurance can be a flexible instrument for "regulating the labour market 
deregulation" which ongoing adjustments (contributions to social security depending 
on the type of contract, quotas, severance pay, unemployment benefits) need no 
legislation changes but just administrative decisions. 
Note that a kind of "firing insurance" (Abfertigungsrecht) has been already introduced in 
Austria in the form of individual saving accounts (OECD 2006, p. 99). However, their 
regulation is not conditioned by the type of contract. 
The basic minimum income model assumes a flat income paid by the state to all residents 
regardless of their earnings and property status (Keller and Seifert 2005, p. 320). The traces of 
this model appear in some social security branches like child care allowances or old-age 
provisions. For instance, Kindergeld in Germany is paid to all parents. Some basic minimum 
options are practiced in Switzerland for retirement (Brombacher-Steiner 2000). In a sense, the 
conception of basic minimum income in incorporated in the minimum wage (Schulten et al 
2006). The additional budget expenditures for the basic minimum income can be covered by  
• flexinsurance,  
• higher taxes of high-earners (to subtract the flat income), and  
• funds released from reducing the number of civil servants currently working in social 
security (since the system becomes more simple).  
The flexinsurance with the basic minimum income model make the European policies no 
longer contradictory. Let us see, how flexinsurance and basic income model contribute to 
each policy mentioned, and how the policies become consistent with each other. 
European welfare policy. The basic minimum income model meets the concept of welfare 
state since it guarantees some unconditional living standards and discharges social tension.  
Flexibilization of employment relations. Being no longer restricted by law, flexibilization is 
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but constrained by financial means within the flexinsurance. Such a constraint is much 
"softer" than rigid juridical prohibitions. 
Flexicurity. The basic minimum income model means a significant progress in social security 
and therefore meets the idea of the flexicurity trade-off: “more security for more flexibility”. 
At the same time, flexinsurance can "softly" regulate flexibilization to keep the situation at 
the flexicurity trade-off.  
Make work pay. Since the basic minimum model guarantees statutory payments regardless 
of income, moving to work means a pure net profit. Therefore, there can be no situations 
when moving to work is little attractive due to losing out-of-work benefits. On the other hand, 
the lack of social benefits excludes their penalty cuts. The penalty measures of the policy 
"make work pay" are replaced by a more efficient benevolent motivation to work under the 
basic income model (cf .with A.Carnegie's "There is no way to force somebody to do 
something other than to make to wish it"). Thereby the "make work pay" policy gains from 
the measures proposed and becomes compatible with flexicurity. 
Respecting civil society initiatives. Introducing flexinsurance means respecting the trade-
unionist position on constraining the total deregulation of labour markets. Besides, the basic 
minimum income guarantees that unemployed do not accept any job offer, as intended by 
penalizing measures of  the policy "make work pay", and thereby will not become “strike 
breakers” in the long-running trade union struggle for good working conditions and fair pay.  
Additionally, it should be emphasized that unifying employment regulation and social 
security norms will contribute to the European integration. 
The last but not least factor in preserving the European welfare state is constraining the 
openness of European financial markets. In fact, easy foreign investments actually mean 
easily moving jobs from Europe to countries with cheap labour. Thereby, employers get a 
legal instrument to make pressure on European governments: "If you do not relax 
employment protection according to our requirements we shall move jobs to developing 
countries". Thereby, having liberalized finances, European governments paved the way to 
losing control over labour markets. It is known that the exit should be found where the 
entrance was. To get the control back, the financial markets have to be somewhat constrained. 
Certainly, if social priorities are respected sincerely and consistently. 
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Discussion 3 (instrumental): Monitoring tools for flexicurity  
The contradiction between some European policies can hardly be eliminated as long as the 
situation remains out of operational control and empirical feedback. It can be said that 
flexicurity is a policy strategy with no map, navigation instruments or even a compass. If 
flexicurity strategies are on the agenda of the European Union, this gap should be filled in. 
For this purpose, it is suggested to do the following 
• Operationalize, that is, rigorously define and quantitatively characterize, several types 
of labour market flexibility and several types of security  
• Adequately measure and reflect by indicators their progress with taking into account 
the mobility of employment groups with different employment protection legislation 
and eligibility to social security benefits  
• Reveal flexibility-security trade-offs 
• Compare the real progress of countries with the flexicurity trade-offs and with regard 
to approaching the "flexicurity edge" in the flexicurity charts 
• Visualize the results and present them to European policy makers and broad public 
The given paper suggests an example of operational approach to flexicurity and attempts to 
define a framework for further modelling. Other approaches are in no case excluded and 
should be regarded as complementary. 
It might be reasonable to charge the European Commission with developing a monitoring 
environment with custom-defined output (similarly to the New Cronos internet page which 
outputs customized extractions from the Eurostat's Labour Force Survey). The variety of 
questions and output options is quite large, and making a preset output may be too restrictive 
for policy-makers and scholars. Such a project could be launched within the Joint Research 
Center of the EC and Eurostat. 
On the other hand, some common guide-lines and target standards should be adopted by the 
European Union with a certain phases and transitional periods. The targeting and controlling 
assumes measurability and the existence of both relevant statistics and composite indicators. 
It might be reasonable to establish a EU monitoring group for pursuing flexicurity policies. 
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Finally, it should be emphasized that the success of flexicurity concept is not least due to the 
catchy word itself which is emotionally associated with two positively-sounded notions of 
flexibility and security, rather than being linked to the destructive "deregulation of labour 
markets". However, as shown by our study, it may be risky to rely only on emotions rather 
than on scientific rigor and empirical knowledge. 
Conclusions 
In spite of a visible roll-back of European social security from the level of the 1980s (Ramaux 
2006), most empirical studies fail to detect its substantial decline (Pettersen 1995, Taylor-
Gooby 1998, Roller 1999, Van Oorschot 1999, and Mau 2001). The focus made on 
governmental expenditures for social support (for references see Adema and Ladaique 2005) 
is rather misleading because it does not take into account increasing living costs and 
flexibilization of employment relations with longer periods of unemployment and lower 
specific payoffs per capita/months. The illusion that social solidarity remains in force 
weakens the position of European welfarism and trade unions, making an impression that 
minor improvements are sufficient to adjust social security to current needs. 
Thus we have operationally defined flexicurity policies as flexibility-security directed country 
trajectories along trade-offs in the flexibility–security vector space. Flexibility is estimated 
with the OECD indicator of strictness of employment protection legislation. Security is 
estimated in three ways, depending on the viewpoint. In the neo-liberal perspective, the social 
security indicator is derived from eligibility conditions to five social security benefits as given 
by the OECD. Under the trade-unionist viewpoint, the consideration is restricted to atypically 
employed. Within the conception of European welfare state, the social security indicator 
focuses on net income replacement rates of unemployed. 
Unlike existing studies, the given article attempts to measure the level of social security with 
respect to the factual rather than institutional changes. In particular, all three models 
considered reduce the indicators to some national average values and show that institutional 
improvements do not compensate the growing size of disadvantageous social groups. A kind 
of debit-credit account shows that wins are smaller than losses and winners are fewer than 
losers. For instance, minor advantages for flexibly employed turn into great disadvantages for 
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regularly employed. It results in a negative general balance, so that the concept of flexicurity 
may not be holding up to its political promises and theoretical declarations. 
A possible solution can be attained by flexinsurance — easily updatable regulation of labour 
market in the form of insurance of flexible labour — and basic minimum income model. 
Besides their contribution to flexicurity implementation, they could solve some contradictions 
between actual European policies and between employers and trade unions. Constraining 
European financial markets could weaken the employers' pressure on European governments. 
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Annex: Answers to the questions of organizers of the expert 
meeting in Lisbon 25.09.2006 
Conceptual and methodological questions 
1. What are the main differences between labour market de-regulation and flexicurity 
strategies? 
 
Flexicurity differs from unconditional deregulation in introducing 
compensatory measures in social security and employment activation (p. 12, 
after Definition 1). 
 
2. What are the main differences between flexicurity approaches and typical “active” 
welfare state policies? 
 
Flexicurity is driven by the flexibilization process. Therefore the advantages in 
social security are "not benevolent" for governments, as "active welfare state 
policies", but conditioned by the necessity to compensate the deregulation of 
labour market in a deliberate proportion (Definitions 1–2 in pp. 12–13). 
 
3. To what extent is it possible to agree on a consensual definition of the concept of 
“flexicurity”? 
 
General definitions are quite compatible (see the next paragraph). Specific 
understandings (definitions) of flexicurity may depend on flexibilization steps 
suggested, tempo of deregulation, particular social advantages proposed, and 
estimates of their compensatory equivalence.  
A consensus in balancing these factors is not a pure academic question but 
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rather an issue for bargaining between governments, employers, and trade 
unions, similarly to collective agreements (p.12, after Definition 1). 
 
How can we define it and which are its core dimensions? 
  
Definition 1 (metaphorical, p.12) Flexicurity is a flexibilization (= 
deregulation) of labour markets with "a human face", that is, compensated by 
some social advantages, in particular, for the groups affected. 
 
Definition 2 (conceptual, p.13)  [Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that 
attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of 
labour markets, work organization and labour relations on the one hand, and to 
enhance security — employment security and social security — notably for 
weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand (Wilthagen 
1998–2004). 
 
Definition 4 (trade-unionist, p.29) [Flexicurity is] social protection for 
flexible work forces, understood as "an alternative to pure flexibilization" 
(Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 226), and "to a deregulation-only policy" 
(Klammer 2004, p. 283); see also WSI (2000). 
  
Definition 3 (instrumental, linked to a specific graphic representation, p. 
20) A "flexicure" country" is the one which vector is located close to the high 
flexibility–high security edge of the flexibility–security rectangle. Pursuing a 
flexicurity policy corresponds to a motion of the country's vector in the plane 
"Strictness of EPL–Social security" along an indifference curve of social 
utility towards lower strictness of EPL and higher social security (‘North-
West’). 
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Principal flexibility and security dimensions (pp. 13–16): 
 
• External numerical flexibility (ease of "hiring and firing") 
• Internal numerical flexibility (variable working hours)  
• Functional flexibility (mobility of workers within enterprises) 
• Wage flexibility (pay on individual performance basis) 
• Externalization flexibility (no employment but commercial contracts) 
• Job security (retaining a specific job with a specific employer) 
• Employment security (remaining at work) 
• Income security (minimum wage, social security, old-age provisions) 
• Combination security (compatibility of paid work with other activities) 
 
4. To what extent can a reduction of Employment Protection Law (EPL) be 
counterweighted by a reinforcement of active labour market policies (ALMP) and 
social protection policies (both being redefined in the light of activation principles) 
without producing an even greater imbalance of labour relations? 
 
The minimal basic income and flexinsurance, solving contradictions between 
actual European policies, operate as an activation policy, because the basic 
income makes any transition to work profitable (unlike the current policy 
"make work pay"), and at the same time as powerful employment and social 
protection measures. The flexinsurance contributes to cover higher social 
expenditures and to flexibly regulate employment relations (pp. 39–41).  
 
5. In countries with low EPL, which would be the main implications of the adoption of a 
flexicurity strategy, namely concerning ALMP and Social Protection Policies?  
 
A flexicurity strategy would imply an enhancement of the European social 
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model without however restricting the labour market flexibility. As a joint 
measure it will contribute to the European integration (pp. 39–41). 
 
6. Is it possible and desirable to create an European index of flexicurity?  
 
If flexicurity policies are on the EU agenda, one needs monitoring instruments. 
Their creation is possible, and the given paper suggests an example of 
operational approach (p. 42–43). Other approaches are in no case excluded and 
should be regarded as complementary. 
 
7. Given present constraints and possibilities, what is the margin left by the existing 
legal framework to political initiative in this domain at the European level? 
 
Launching flexinsurance and introducing elements of the basic income model 
can become instruments for flexibly regulating employment relations and 
social security. Minor improvements in social security in response to the global 
structural change in the labour markets are not relevant. It should be  realized 
that the level of social security reform should match the level of  changes in 
labour market regulation. We should not follow Saltykov-Shchzedrin's (1826–
1889) satire "How to make an unprofitable enterprise profitable, not changing 
anything in it?" (p. 39) 
8. What instruments should be created in order to launch a European integrated system 
to monitor the situation and progress of the 25 member-states in the development of 
flexicurity strategies? 
 
The approach discussed in this paper is exactly an attempt to operationally 
define flexicurity and to define a framework for further modeling. It is 
suggested to do the following (p. 42): 
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Operationalize, that is, rigorously define and quantitatively characterize, 
several types of labour market flexibility and several types of security 
enumerated in Question 3 
Adequately measure and reflect by indicators their progress with taking into 
account the mobility of employment groups with different employment 
protection legislation and eligibility to social security benefits 
Reveal flexibility-security trade-offs 
Compare the real progress of countries with the flexicurity trade-offs and with 
regard to approaching the "flexicurity edge" in the flexicurity charts 
Visualize the results and present them to European policy makers and broad 
public 
It might be reasonable to charge the European Commission with developing a 
monitoring environment with custom-defined output (similarly to the New 
Cronos internet page which outputs customized extractions from the Eurostat's 
Labour Force Survey). The variety of questions and output options is quite 
large, and making a preset output may be too restrictive for policy-makers and 
scholars. Such a project could be launched within the Joint Research Center of 
the EC and Eurostat. 
 
Political questions 
9. What are the main obstacles for the adoption, at the European level, of flexicurity 
strategies as a framework for (a) employment policies, (b) labour market regulation 
policies, (c) social protection policies? 
 
The main obstacle is the contradiction between European policies (pp. 38–41): 
• European welfare policy  
• fexibilization of employment relations 
 
 
49
   
 
• flexicurity  
• make work pay  
• European policy of respecting civil society initiatives 
  
10. Would it be necessary to promote changes in the European Employment Strategy in 
order to give adequate answers to these questions? If so, which should be the core 
points of such changes? 
 
Yes, some corrections should be done. It relates mainly to the replacement of 
rigid Yes/no employment protection rules by smooth regulation of employment 
flexibility by adjustable progressive contributions to social security. The 
penalty measures of the policy "make work pay" should be replaced by a more 
efficient benevolent motivation to work under the basic income model; cf. with 
A.Carnegie's "There is no way to force somebody to do something other than 
to make to wish it" (p. 41).  
  
11. Conversely, would it be necessary to change European social protection policies? If 
so, which should be the core points of such changes? 
 
See the answer to Question 10 
 
12. What other European instruments should be created to develop synergies between the 
national and the European Union levels in order to promote flexicurity strategies in 
the 25 member-states? 
 
Some common guide-lines and target standards should be adopted with a 
certain phases and transitional periods. The targeting and controlling assumes 
measurability and the existence of both relevant statistics and composite 
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indicators. It might be reasonable to establish a EU monitoring group for 
pursuing flexicurity policies (p. 42). 
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